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A simple model of a centrally planned economy is developed with a state 
sector and private sector, and with a supply constraint affecting state 
sector output. In such a model, a supply multiplier can be derived 
under the same conditions which would make an increase in state sector 
prices an effective means of reducing shortage. Moreover, a one-sector 
constrained equilibrium model of the state sector does not yield 
misleading results by ignoring the private sector; and the private 






















































































































































































SUPPLY MULTIPLIERS IN A CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMY 
WITH A PRIVATE SECTOR
Introduction
It is well known by now that an economy facing a predominance of 
supply constraints can experience a supply multiplier analogous to 
the familiar Keynesian-type expenditure multiplier which occurs in 
a demand constrained economy. These phenomena are usually 
analysed in a highly aggregated model with fixed prices, a single 
output produced by labour, and money [e.g. see Malinvaud (1977), 
Barro and Grossman (1976), and on the supply multiplier itself, 
Barro and Grossman (197^)]. In such a simple model, it is no 
surprise to find that only a limited number of types of 
equilibrium are possible, depending on the constraints agents 
perceive in the goods and labour markets respectively. Thus in 
the case where firms do not hold output stocks, only three 
constrained equilibria can arise (i.e. in addition to the 
Walrasian equilibrium):
(a) Keynesian equilibrium
firms face demand constraints in the product market,





























































































firms face supply constraints in the labour market and 
households face supply constraints in the product market.
(c) Classical equilibrium
households face supply constraints in the product market 
and demand constraints in the labour market.
The object of this paper is to take up the story of the second 
type of equilibrium, repressed inflation, extending it to cover a 
centrally planned economy. However, the model needs some 
modifications, partly to take account of points raised by Kornai 
(1980) in his analysis of shortage conditions under central 
planning (but for a critical review of Kornai's analysis, see also 
Hare (1986)), and partly to disaggregate. The latter will enable 
us to distinguish; between the state sector within which central 
planning prevails, and a presumably smaller, though more flexible, 
private sector. The reasons for doing this are twofold.
First, we can achieve somewhat greater realism: even in the most
centralised economy, it is a serious mistake to imagine that the 
whole of production is always subject to the planners' dictates. 
There is always at least a small sphere of economic activity 
operating according to something approximating to normal market 
principles. Second, the resulting model will allow us to address 
and properly investigate, an intriguing remark in Nuti (1986, p.




























































































'Consumers are indeed quantity-rationed in the 
state sector but they are not subject 
individually to overall quantity constraints 
since they can always spend their money in the 
secondary market. It follows that the "supply 
multiplier", i.e. rounds of reduction in labour 
supply (and therefore consumer good supply) which 
are alleged as a consequence of quantity 
constraints, do not necessarily occur and can 
only be expected to be present in the same 
circumstances in which labour supply would 
respond negatively to open inflation.'
This comment formed part of an argument directed against some of 
the recent empirical work on Eastern Europe based on 
Barro-Grossman models (e.g. Portes (198U), Quandt et al (1987), 
Charemza and Gronicki (1989) and others). However, while Nuti's 
comment is formally correct, the argument as a whole is not as 
compelling as he would have us believe; this will become more 
apparent as our analysis proceeds.
In the next section, we set out a two sector model of a planned 
economy with private sector, to serve as the basis for the 
remainder of the paper. Normally, in these constrained equilib­
rium models, disaggregation leads to a multiplicity of types of 
equilibria which rapidly becomes too complicated to be of any 
general interest. However, in the model developed below I shall 
concentrate on just one equilibrium which is the one most likely 
to be observed. Section three then studies the comparative 
statics of the model for a special, more tractable case. It turns 
out that supply multipliers do not always arise, as indicated by 




























































































is precisely as he asserts; moreover in the specific model 
studied in detail, their magnitude is unaffected by the presence 
of the private sector. Consequently an approximation to the model 
which ignores the private sector is not likely to be as misleading 
as Nuti argues. Because of this, the empirical work he attacks 
cannot be regarded as fatally flawed, at least not on this 
account. Of course, it may still be vulnerable to attacks from 
other standpoints, such as Kornai (1980), but that would take us 
beyond the scope of the present paper.
2. Two sector model of a planned economy
We begin with the state sector of the economy. This sector is 
assumed to produce a single output, y-|, using labour, L-|, 
according to the standard, concave production function,
yi - fi(L,) ( D
The price of state output, pi, and the wage rate received by the 
labour force employed in the state sector, w^, are both assumed to 
be given and fixed. As is usual in centrally planned economies, 
the profits accruing from state production,




























































































are assumed to be paid directly into the state budget. Since we 
do not subsequently discuss the budget, or the state's financial 
balances in general, this means that these profits play no part in 
the subsequent analysis. While clearly unsatisfactory in 
anything other than a short-run model, this approach is essen­
tially the same as that employed in Malinvaud (1977). It is 
therefore subject to the same limitations, though convenient for 
the present analysis.
In the current plan period, we suppose that the planners require 
output for investment, exports, etc. Hence, the state output
available for private consumption, x-| « yi” Zj. Note that it is 
not appropriate to make an assumption concerning profit maximis­
ation in the state sector, though in order to make use of 
production functions in a sensible way it is necessary to 
postulate that firms do at least seek to minimise costs.
Problems of ensuring this in a centrally planned economy take us 
well beyond the scope of this paper.
Turning to the private sector, this, too produces a single output, 
y2 , using labour L2, according to the well-behaved production 
function,



























































































Output price, P2 , and wage rate, W2 , for this sector will 
subsequently be determined by market clearing conditions. But the 
sector should be thought of as being composed of numerous small 
firms behaving competitively. Hence at (P2 ,W2 ), demand for labour 
in the private sector will be determined by the usual condition:
W2 = P2 | l f ( H )
Unlike in the state sector, private sector profits,
v,, = P2y2 “ W2L.2 (5)
are entirely a contribution to private sector income. This means 
that we ignore any taxation of private profits. However, in most 
socialist countries such taxation is small or negligible and in 
any case it is clear that a great deal of private income would 
never be adequately reported to the authorities. Nevertheless, 
the addition of taxation to the model is easily done, though it 
has no effect on the principal results reported below. Also, it 
would not be difficult to model the private sector somewhat 
differently, essentially as a mechanism through which part of 
state output is resold at a price above the official state price, 
the profits accruing to the traders concerned. But that approach 




























































































So much for the supply side of the economy. Let us now consider 
demand, in particular consumers' demand for goods and services, 
and the supply of labour to both sectors. We model this by 
treating the demand side of the economy as if it were the result 
of utility maximisation by a single household. This implies, of 
course, that any distributional considerations are completely 
neglected, but these are unlikely to be crucial for the present 
discussion. Accordingly, we begin with a strictly concave utility 
function of the following form:
u = u(c; , C2 , L-|*-Li, L2-L2 , m) (6)
where c;, C2 are the consumption of state and private sector 
output respectively; L-| and L2 have already been defined and L; , 
L2 are the maximum amounts of labour which could be supplied; and 
m is the stock of; money which the household sector wishes to carry 
forward into the next period (this is a standard device to make it 
possible to compress a multi-time period model into a single 
period, to simplify analysis; the technical details of the 
procedure need not detain us). It might be thought that a more 
appropriate formulation of u(-) would replace the arguments L;-L;, 
L2-L2 in (6) with the single argument (L-L1 -L2). However, in 
practice the two types of labour are not perfect substitutes. To 
a large extent they are supplied by different people, though some 




























































































essential to secure access to state benefits etc., which are not 
formally modelled here. The aggregation implicit in (6) 
completely masks such detail.
The household sector maximises (6) subject to a budget constraint, 
and subject to any other constraints on feasible transactions.
The budget constraint assumes the form:
P ic i  + P2C2 + m = w-|Li + W2 L 2  + it 2 + M (7 ) ,
where M is the initial stock of money holdings and other notation 
has all been defined above. Equality can be assumed in (7) 
provided that u(-) has the property of non-satiation.
Up to this point, the treatment of the household sector is 
entirely conventional. In particular, maximising (6) subject only 
to (7 ) yields a demand function for state sector output of the 
form:
ci = di (pi, P2 , wi, w2, 1:2 + M) (8)
and a corresponding labour supply function to the state sector:



























































































Similar equations can be obtained for the private sector:
c2 = d2 (pi , P2, w i , W2 , it 2 + M) )
l2 ” p2 (P1> P2> W1 • w2> v 2 + M) } (10)
Equilibrium values for p2 and w2 can then be obtained from (H), 
together with the market clearing condition:
c2 " f2(^2) (1 1 )»
where c2 and L2 are as specified in (10). Let the equilibrium 
values of p2 and w2 be p2* and w2*. Inserting these values into 
(8) and (9) (including in tt2) gives us levels of consumption of 
state sector output, and labour supply to the state sector, which 
we denote by (c-|*, L-)*). Let us now make the following
Assumption f•) (L-)*) < C|* + Z-\
A number of separate conditions are implicit in this simple 
statement. First, there is no direction of labour, so the state 
sector can employ no more than the available labour supply L^*, 
hence f •) (L-] *) is the maximum level of output which the state 
sector can supply. Second, this supply is insufficient to meet 
the forthcoming demand, either because p-] is too low in relation 
to w-j or because Z-\ is too large in relation to total output, or 




























































































planned economies over a long period, it is clear that this 
reflects the real situation for much of the time. Kornai (1980)
goes further than this, to argue that such shortage Is endemic.
The Important implication of the above assumption is that some 
demands placed on the economy cannot be fulfilled. In the short 
run analysis which is my principal concern, I assume that the 
planners adjust neither p-] nor wi , nor Zi, so that all the 
adjustment is borne by households, or occurs within the private 
sector. Later on, we shall examine the impact of varying these 
parameters. The household sector's optimisation problem, 
therefore, takes the following constrained form:
Max u(c-|, C2 , L-|-Li, L2-L2, m)
{ci,C2 ,Li ,L2 , m)
subject to‘Pi ci + P2C2 + m = W 1L1 + W2L2 +
and also: ĉ  = f-) (L-j ) - Z-\
By assumption, both constraints in (12) are binding, and we know 
that the solution should be characterised by c-| < c^* and 
presumably also by L-j < L-|*. As before, once this has been 
solved, the equilibrium values of p2 and W2 are found by imposing 
the conditions (9) and (10). This completes the general statement 





























































































To make further progress it is simplest to work in terms of a 
special case. The most convenient functional forms for our 
purposes are the following:
(a) Linear production functions:
*1 = a1 Li )
y2 = a2L2 ) (13)
(1 3 ) ensures that in equilibrium, the private sector 
will yield no profits, i.e. ir2 - 0.
(b) Linear expenditure system, based on the utility function:
u = ln(c-|-Y-|)+ a2ln(c2~Y2)+ 61 lh(Li +L1 ) + B2ln(L2^L2)+ 61n(m)
(1 U),
where it is helpful to assume that (01+02) + (61+62) + & = 1
Maximising (11|) subject to the budget constraint, (7), yields the 
solution:
C1 = 11 + Q1 N )
P1 )
)
c2 = y2 + a? N }
P2 }
)
L1 - Il - Bi N )
«1 )
}
L2 = L2 - 62 N )
w2 }




























































































where supernumerary income, N = (M + w-|Li + W2L2 ^ P1 Y1 P2Y2)
(16)
(we have incorporated *2 • 0 into (16)).
Equilibrium in the private sector is achieved by imposing 
conditions (4) and (10), which now take the form:
w2 = a2P2 (17)
and
C2 = 82^2
i.e. Y2 + 02. N = a2 (L2 ** _§2 . N)
p2 ‘' w2 (18)
After some manipulation, it is straightforward to show that
P2* = (a? * 8?) •( Mi )
1-(a2 + 82) (a2^2 ^2 ) (19)
where N-j = M + w-|Li - Y1P1 ; the corresponding value of W2* then 
follows from (17). Hence
O,* = Yi + a]_ (____ N-| )
P 1 (1K<X2 + 8 2) )
Li* - Li - Bl ( Ni )































































































Notice that in this simple example, the effect of the private 
sector on the demand for state sector output, and on the supply of 
labour to the state sector, only operates through the two 
parameters 02 and BU- This would not remain the case in more 
general specifications.
The fundamental assumption introduced earlier now takes the 
special form:
a-|Li* < ci* + Zi ( 22) ,
and we now examine the consequences of imposing this assumption on 
the above specification.
The simplest procedure is to start by maximising (11!) with the 
additional constraint ci = xi ( < ci*, by assumption), which we 
can do provided, of course, that xi > Yi. The solution is the 
following:
<=1 - *1 )
)
c2 “ y2 + «2!- N1 )
P2 ))
h - M  - ill- N1 )
W1 >
l 2 ■= l2 - izi- N1 )w2 ' )
)



























































































where agl = «2 / (012 + 81 + B2 + *) and similarly for B1 1 , 62'» 
and 6  ̂i
and N 1 = (M + w^hi + W2L.2 “ p-|xi - P2Y2) (21!)
Then, for the given level of x-|, equilibrium in the private market 
yields an equation for p2 identical to (19), except that (021,
B2  ̂ and N 11 ) replace (02, fti, N-|), where Nil - M + w-|Li - P1X1 . 
Making the same substitution in (21) then yields the new supply of 
labour to the state sector, given the constraint on c-|. Finally, 
we use the state sector goods market balance, in the form 
xi = a-|Li k Z 1 , to determine the equilibrium value for the 
constraint on consumption of state output, x-). The solution makes 
economic sense provided that
«1 > aiB 1 = A
P1 B1 + 6 (25),
where A is used to denote the right hand side, in which case the 
solution is:
<*1 “ *1 ” ai(6L-|Wi - B1M) - Z-|Wi(Bl + 6)
W1 (B1 + S) pia^ $1 (26)
Given (26), the rest of the solution is easily calculated, so 
there is no need to write it down here. In any case, (26) is what 
we need to derive the comparative statics that are of greatest 




























































































the private sector of our model economy [esp. (19) amended to 
replace (o2 iB2 iNl) with 02^1 62' and N 1 >̂ and using the value of 
x-| from (26)].
Supply multiplier
From (26), dci = 1
dZl 1 - Api/wi (27)
Thus a unit increase in the state's requirement for final output,
, reduces private consumption of state output (in the new 
constrained equilibrium) by the amount indicated in (27). This is 
a multiple of the original change in Z1( so it follows that state 
output as a whole actually falls. Specifically,
dyi = 1 - 1 = - Xpi/wi
dZi 1 1 - lpi/w-| 1 “ ipi/w-| (28)
By the same token, equilibrium labour supply to the state sector 
also declines. Note, however, that these results do not depend at 
all on the behaviour of the private sector except to the extent 
that the existence or otherwise of the sector might affect the 
parameter, X. However, it is hard to see why there should be any 
such effect, since X depends only on labour productivity in the 





























































































Naturally, despite that fact that the presence of the private 
sector does not influence the magnitude of the state sector supply 
multiplier, the tightening of supply constraints in the state 
sector (i.e. raising Z 1 ) does affect private sector production.
In particular, it is easy to show that:
a
la = a2 d£g = 
dZi





dc? = a2 dL? = 9 c ?  . dp? + 9 c ? . dci
dZ-j dZi 3p2 dZ-I 9x-| dZ]
= - ° ? 1P1 C O  + 
a 2 P 2 N O
a2 )N-|1 + « 2 ^ 2 ] .
a
la V o
Hence the equilibrium price and wage in the private sector both 
rise, and output and employment also increases. Since the ratio 
wg/pg is unchanged, it is clear that all workers experience a fall 
in their real income, a fall that is most pronounced for those 
employed wholly in the state sector (this remark abstracts from 
the one household assumption employed in the formal analysis). 
Intuitively, since state output has become relatively more 
'scarce', one might have expected its relative price to rise. 
However, to restore equilibrium requires a fall in the real wage 
and with p-|, wi fixed, the only way in which this can occur in the 
model is via an increase in pg.
Two observations can be made at this point. First, the results 
obtained imply that a conventional, one sector, constrained 
equilibrium model of the state sector of this economy will not 




























































































simply doesn't matter from this point of view. Second, the 
monotonic relationship between Z-) and pj means that we can make 
correct inferences about the degree of shortage in this economy 
simply by studying P2 or, equivalently, the ratio P2/P1 , as is 
commonly done.
Suppose, now, that the planners permitted open inflation, in the 
sense that they allowed pi to increase, presumably in the hope of 
choking off some of the excess demand for state sector output.
From (26), it is straightforward to derive the effect of an 
increase in the price of state sector output, p-|, on equilibrium 
consumption:
1 dci = \ > 0
ci dpi wi - pi\ (31),
provided that (25) holds. Hence, just as Nuti asserted (see quote 
in introduction), permitting an increase in p-j, is effective in 
exactly the same circumstances as those in which a well-defined 
supply multiplier can be obtained.
1 . d (pi c-)) - wi______  > 0
Pici dpi P1(«1 -p-|A) (32),
from which it follows that as p-| increases, and Ni 1 decline, 
and pg also falls (therefore so does W2); C2 and L2 can either 





























































































These last results can be interpreted quite simply. First, the 
increase in p-) reduces c-| * and increases Li* (from (20) and (2 1 ), 
hence reducing the imbalance in the market for state sector output 
as measured by the conventional Walrasian demand and labour supply 
functions. The initially increased willingness to supply labour 
to the state sector then translates into an actual increase in 
labour supply, and a corresponding increase in equilibrium output, 
when the supply constraint which consumers still face is properly 
allowed for. Evidently the gaps between c-| and C|*, and Li and Li* 
both decline, another indication that the planners get closer to 
the Walrasian equilibrium when they allow p̂  to increase.
Finally, what happens in the private sector is less clear cut: 
although equilibrium price and wage rate certainly fall, output 
can move in either direction. Moreover, the effect on real wages 
is also unclear.'
H. Conclusion
The model we have developed shows that the addition of a private 
sector to a model of a centrally planned economy in which 
consumers face supply constraints from the state sector is an 
interesting and useful exercise. Nutl's assertion is justified, 
and some additional results are also obtained. In particular, a 
one sector, constrained equilibrium model of the state sector will 




























































































sector; and movements in the private sector price level give us a 
reliable guide to the degree of shortage experienced in the state 
sector of the economy.
Strictly speaking, the case analysed here is not identical to that 
considered by Nuti. Whereas we have modelled a separate private 
sector, Nuti is also concerned with the situation where there is a 
'secondary market' in state sector output, in which part of such 
output is retraded at (presumably) higher prices. However, it is 
not difficult to extend the above analysis to cover this case (e.g. 
by allowing the private sector a second, retrading activity; 
though with strict limits on the volume of business, partly to 
avoid collapse of the model to the market equilibrium solution, 
partly to reflect real controls imposed by the central planners), 
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